identifying how the distribution of tactics over time Using a simulated employment contract negotiation, moves negotiations to resolution (see Holmes (1992) this research tested for differences in the use of cuing and Putnam (1990) for reviews). It implies that the and responding strategies across four types of out-frequency with which tactics occur at specific times is comes (stalemate, win-lose, suboptimum, and opti-critical to whether negotiations will be resolved. The mum), over time, and across time and outcomes. The second stream has focused on establishing links beuse of five strategies varied over time, portraying the tween the frequency with which strategies are used negotiating process as one of decreasing flexibility. Reand the quality of negotiated outcomes (e.g., Pruitt & sults also showed that distributive outcomes were char- Lewis, 1975; see Putnam & Jones, 1982, for an early acterized by high levels of positional information exreview) and implies that outcome quality is primarily change whereas integrative agreements were characterized by high levels of priority-information exchange. a function of the proportions in which distributive and It was possible to further differentiate two integrative integrative strategies are used. In this research, we outcomes (suboptimum and optimum) in terms of how link the two approaches by considering if both fretwo strategies were used over time: optimum outcomes quency and timing determine whether a settlement is were associated with a rapid decrease in positional ar-reached and the quality of that settlement.
A substantial proportion of the research examining suboptimum outcomes showed the reverse pattern. Neilinks between negotiator strategies and outcomes has ther the frequency with which strategies were used nor focused on establishing relationships between the fretheir timing was able to differentiate impasse from quency of strategy use and the quality (integrativeness) win-lose outcomes. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
of negotiated outcomes. A fundamental assumption in this research is that negotiators are strongly influenced by their general orientation to the negotiation (e.g., Two streams of negotiation research, both focusing Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985 ; on the frequency with which particular strategies and Pruitt, 1990) . Researchers have distinguished between tactics are used, acknowledge the importance of landistributive (or competitive) and integrative (or collabguage in negotiation. The first stream, represented by orative) orientations and have argued that these differphase models of negotiation, has been concerned with ences in orientation result in different goals, strategies and tactics (e.g., . There is considerable
This research was supported by funding from a University of Melempirical support for this argument and for the view bourne Special Initiatives Grant, an Economics and Commerce Facthat these differences affect negotiator outcomes.
ulty Research Grant and Australian Research Council Grant SG7935603. We thank Sue Olaman and Cindy Shum for their assisNegotiations that are characterized by a collaboratance in transcribing the videotapes of negotiations, and two anony-uals place a high priority on achieving both their part- Weingart et al., 1993; Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGilliccuddy & Syna, 1992 ). ner's and their own goals (Pruitt, 1983) . Such negotiations seek to maximize the resource pool and use While this research establishes strong support for a information exchange as a mechanism for establishing relationship between the frequency with which negotitrust, understanding opponents' needs and prefer-ators use distributive and integrative strategies and ences, and retaining flexibility until the close of negoti-the outcomes that they achieve, it treats the two styles ations . Integrative outcomes of bargaining and their associated outcomes as mutuare more likely to occur when individuals adopt a col-ally exclusive. Such analyses ignore the complex, laborative orientation, which is characterized by more mixed-motive nature of negotiations, which requires proposals and counterproposals (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) , individuals to both identify the available resources and problem-solving (Putnam & Wilson, 1989) , discussions determine their distribution (e.g., Lax & Sebenius, about the workability of solutions (Putnam & Wilson, 1986; . It further neglects the possibility 1989), a greater level of agreement with opponents' that outcomes are not determined solely by the freproposals (Donohue, Diez & Hamilton, 1985; Putnam & quency with which strategies are used, but also their Jones, 1989; Roloff, Tutzauer & Dailey, 1989) , more timing. For example , in reviewing modeffort in uncovering underlying needs, less time in gen-els of negotiation, links the temporal location of integerating specific solutions (Sheppard, Blumenfeld-rative and distributive strategies to negotiation out- Jones & Roth, 1989) , and more systematic concessions comes. On this basis, we consider whether the timing (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) . Generally, such strategies re-of negotiator strategies is a useful predictor of outcome flect limited positional commitment and greater flexi-quality. bility (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Sheppard et al., 1989;  Comparatively little research has examined whether Weingart et al., 1993) . the distribution of strategies over time predicts either Conversely, negotiations characterized by a competi-the resolution of negotiations or the quality of that resotive orientation emphasize differences and are associ-lution. Indirect support for this argument is found in ated with more coercive processes aimed at influencing the mediation literature, which provides evidence that opponents' resistance points while maximizing own tactic use across phases varies as a function of whether gain (Deutsch, 1973; Lax & Sebenius, 1986 ; Lewicki & or not disputes are resolved. This research has shown Litterer, 1985) . As a consequence, information ex-that resolved and unresolved disputes differ in terms change becomes tactical ; Wil-of strategy distribution across mediation phases. Genson & Putnam, 1990) , with negotiators being concerned erally, agreement mediators use all tactics available to to maximize the information they receive while min-them more evenly across the mediation session (Doimizing the information that they give (Walton & nohue, 1989) . However, they implement information McKersie, 1965) . In such negotiations, the exchange of search earlier in the negotiation (Donohue, 1989) and information is used as a means to control the negotia-spend more time in the middle stages discussing facts tion process and is dominated by information seeking and interests (Donohue, Drake & Roberts, 1994) while rather than information giving (Wilson & Putnam, also managing process (Jones, 1988) . By the end of ne-1990). Increased argumentation, threats, and the as-gotiations, they are more focused on proposal developsertion of needs all signal an attempt to gain power ment (Jones, 1988) . This research identifies the timing within the negotiation . Dis-of mediator interventions as critical in determining tributive outcomes, which are a likely consequence of whether disputes will be successfully resolved. such tactics, are characterized by positional and irreleFurther indirect support is provided by Lim and vant argumentation (Lewis & Fry, 1977; Lewicki & Murnighan (1994) , who tested patterns of negotiator Litterer, 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; activity against four models. Although they found some 1989), personal attacks (Lewis & Fry, 1977) , and high evidence of increases in concessions as the deadline demands and concessions (Bateman, 1980;  Hamner & approached, they also reported considerable individual Harnett, 1975; MacMurray & Lawler, 1986; Putnam & differences in the frequency and pattern with which different tactics were used. A plausible explanation is Wilson, 1989; Smith, Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982) . Furthermore, increases in positional argumentation are that there is a direct relationship not only between the frequency, but also the pattern of tactics and eventual associated with more false information, pressure tactics, and the demand for concessions (Pruitt & Lewis, outcomes. Finally, Putnam, Wilson, and Turner (1990) provide direct support by demonstrating that the tim-1975), as well as an increased possibility of deadlock (Roloff et al., 1989) . These tactics result in reduced in-ing of strategies predicts outcome quality: integrative outcomes are associated with greater flexibility and formation exchange, greater positional commitment and increased hostility (Carnevale & Lawler, 1987 ; creativity in the final stages of negotiation, whereas distributive outcomes are associated with more posi-sistency ) require some level of contentiousness. Therefore, within the class of integtional argument in these stages. rative outcomes, the use of distributive tactics will disIn this research, we consider how the frequency and tinguish optimum from suboptimum outcomes: Contiming of strategies distinguishes resolved from unretentious tactics aimed at testing the limits of the negosolved disputes, and how it affects the quality of resolutiation should be higher for negotiations ending in tion. We consider two broad classes of outcomes, disoptimum agreements. Further, negotiations ending in tributive and integrative, and further consider the posoptimum outcomes will be characterized by a greater sibility of more fine-grained distinctions between two use of contentious tactics early in the negotiation prokinds of distributive outcome (impasse and win-lose) cess, whereas suboptimum outcomes will be characterand two kinds of integrative outcome (suboptimum and ized by an increasing use of contentious tactics towards optimum). Win-lose outcomes are characterized by low the end of negotiations. joint profit; suboptimum and optimum outcomes are characterized by high joint profit and are distinguished METHOD on the basis of their integrativeness quotient (Tripp & Sondak, 1992) .
Subjects Past research has demonstrated that distributive and integrative outcomes are distinguished by the One hundred twenty-eight undergraduate psycholmore frequent use, respectively, of distributive and in-ogy students at the University of Melbourne particitegrative strategies. Given the need for all negotiators pated in the negotiation of an employment contract. to both create and claim value (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) Participants were run in pairs in separate sessions. we expect the two classes of outcomes to differ not only Outcomes were classified as falling into one of four outin the frequency with which these tactics are used, but comes types (stalemate, distributive, suboptimum, opalso their distribution over time: Negotiations ending timum) according to the criteria outlined below. Thirtyin distributive outcomes will be dominated by the use of nine outcomes were classifiable according to these cridistributive tactics, with integrative tactics increasing teria. over time to facilitate settlement; negotiations ending in integrative outcomes will be dominated by the use Procedure of integrative tactics, with distributive bargaining inSubjects participated in the negotiation of an emcreasing over time as individuals claim value. ployment contract. Written instructions assigned the When negotiations end in distributive outcomes, the role of either an employer or employee, described the principal task for negotiators is to avoid a conflict spiral task, and gave them their payoff schedule and a conthat results in stalemate (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pru- tract for recording their final outcome. They were reitt, 1981, 1983) and this is most likely to be achieved quired to reach agreement on the eight issues shown through the incorporation of some integrative strategies in Table 1 . As can be seen from the table, salary, annual (Pruitt, 1981) . Therefore, within the class of distributive raise, location, and package allowed trade-offs; vacaoutcomes, stalemates and win-lose outcomes will be tion, start date, and medical benefits were distributive, differentiated on the basis of the frequency of conceswhereas contract duration was compatible (i.e., both sions, which will be higher for win-lose outcomes. It is, negotiators earned their highest points by agreeing to however, unlikely that such concessions will be evenly sign a 6-year contract). Subjects were instructed to spread throughout the negotiation; rather, the use of maximize the value of the contract for themselves. A this tactic is more likely to increase during the latter lottery offering a small cash prize was used to provide part of the negotiation, as predicted by deadline models an incentive for this; lottery tickets were allocated on (Lim & Murnighan, 1994) . Two patterns should, therethe basis of contract value. No points were awarded fore, distinguish win-lose outcomes from stalemates: a for stalemates. Negotiation were conducted face-to-face decline in positional arguing over time and a comple-and were videotaped for subsequent analysis. mentary increase in concessions over time.
For negotiations ending in integrative outcomes the Classification of Outcomes principal task for negotiators is to avoid ending negotiations before all solutions have been satisfactorily exOutcomes were classified as follows (the number of plored (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pruitt, 1981 Pruitt, , 1983 ; outcomes so classified is given in brackets). Stalemates Weingart et al., 1993) and this is most (9) were negotiations that were unresolved at the end of likely to be achieved by using a proportion of distribu-the 25-min negotiating period. The remaining outcome tive strategies. Both the expansion of the resource pool types were defined on the basis of joint outcome.
The integrativeness of outcomes was determined by (Pruitt, 1981) and a test of opponent integrity and con- negotiator performance on the four issues that enabled Coding of Negotiations trade-offs. Win-lose (10) outcomes were negotiations The coding scheme described by Donohue et al. in which negotiator joint profit did not exceed the sum (1981) and subsequently adapted by Alexander, Schul, of the compromise solutions. Fully integrative agree-and Babukus (1988) was modified to distinguish bements (i.e., those in which negotiators located all poten-tween positional and priority information exchange. tial trade-offs) yielded a joint outcome of 14,400 points The revised classificatory scheme allows for the coding across the four issues; if negotiators behaved distribu-of each utterance as one of 12 responses (to the other's tively, the maximum joint outcome was 9,600 points. preceding utterance) and as one of 13 cues (for the othAgreements were classified as integrative if the joint er's next utterance). Two raters coded all transcripts outcome was between 12,000 and 14,400 points (12,000 and reliability was assessed using Cohen's k. Bakeman representing the midpoint between distributive and and Gottman (1986) classify k in the range 0.70-0.74 fully integrative outcomes). This category was further as very good and those at or above 0.75 as excellent. subdivided on the basis of an integrativeness quotient Cohen's k was 0.74 for cues and 0.75 for responses. All (Tripp & Sondak, 1992) : A 0 to 1 scale is used to repre-discrepancies were resolved through discussion. sent the ratio of better to worse outcomes, with ''1'' representing settlements for which neither individual Factor Analysis of Cues and Responses can obtain a better outcome without worsening an opponent's outcome. Optimum solutions (12) were defined Utterances were classified as representing one of 13 cues and one of 12 responses, yielding a complex data as those for with in integrativeness quotient of 0.95 or better. Integrative outcomes with an integrativeness set. Following Weingart, Hyder, Prietula, and Genovese (1995) , the initial classification of utterances was quotient below 0.95 were classified as suboptimum (8). factor analyzed to explore the possibility that tactics tion strategy. Finally, the two tactics of proposing modcould be grouped together in a meaningful way. Subse-ifications to an opponent's offer or making concessions quent analyses are based on the factors that emerge lead us to interpret Factor 4 as representing concesfrom these analyses, which could be considered to rep-sionary behavior. resent strategies.
Factor analysis of responses. A principal compoFactor analysis of cues. A principal components nents analysis with Varimax rotation yielded three disanalysis with Varimax rotation yielded four distinct
tinct response factors, shown in Table 3 . Two of the faccue factors, shown in Table 2 . Factor 1 includes tactics tors that emerged in this analysis again fit the descripthat, according to Donohue et al.'s (1981) classificatory tions of distributive and integrative bargaining. Factor scheme, represent either attacking or defending moves.
1 is represented by attacking and defending tactics that This factor includes tactics aimed at establishing and focus on opponents' positional arguments, coupled with supporting a negotiator's position while attempting to contentious tactics aimed at changing that position. This change an opponent's position. These tactics are typical factor is interpreted as representing a positional inforof a distributive bargaining style (e.g., Lewicki & Litmation strategy. Factor 2, which is interpreted as repreterer, 1985) and are interpreted as providing positional senting a priority information strategy, is composed of information. The second factor better represents tactics what Donohue et al. (1981) classify as integrative tacthat attempt to break negotiating scripts by either entics: giving and seeking priority information, as well as gaging in nondirectional discussion or proposing a new a willingness to accept offers. Finally, the third factor way of tackling the negotiation. Factor 2 is therefore also represents a contentious style of bargaining in interpreted as negotiator attempts to restructure the which negotiators either reject opponents' offers or renegotiation. Consistent with descriptions of integrative state their demands. This factor is interpreted as rejecbargaining (e.g., Lewicki & Litterer, 1985) , Factor 3 is tion, as these tactics reject opponents' positions either composed of tactics that either seek or provide priority explicitly or implicitly. It will be noted that one response information, or suggest tradeoffs; consequently, this factor is interpreted as representing a priority-informa-tactic, accepts arguments, has a negative loading on the The preceding discussion of tactics and outcomes suggested (a) that tactical differences would distin-RESULTS guish integrative from distributive outcomes; (b) that optimum integrative outcomes would be distinguished Negotiations ranged in length from 10 to 25 min, from suboptimum ones; (c) that win-lose outcomes consequently differing in the total number of strategies would be distinguished from stalemates. A series of used. This raises the possibility that any differences three planned comparisons on the Outcome factor was that emerged if analyses were conducted on raw freused to test these hypotheses: Contrast 1 compared quencies might simply reflect these differences in overdistributive and integrative outcomes, Contrast 2 comall length. Because our hypotheses involve the relative, pared optimum and suboptimum outcomes, and Conrather than the absolute, frequency with which partictrast 3 compared stalemates and win-lose outcomes. ular strategies are used, the analysis was carried out
We argued that the use of strategies and tactics could on the proportion of times a particular strategy was differ over time; we further argued that trends over used by a dyad during a given phase of the negotiation.
time may serve to differentiate between the four cateTo avoid problems of linear dependency between values gories of outcomes. To test these hypotheses, each tranof the dependent variable (because the sets of proporscript was divided into six equal segments, determined tions always sum to one), one of the strategies was by the number of utterances. To test for differences arbitrarily dropped from the analysis to create a linin the distribution of tactics over time, the linear and early independent set, in the manner described by Harquadratic trend components were also extracted. ris (1985, pp. 109-115) . Before carrying out the analysis, the remaining proportions were subject to a 2arc-Analysis of Cuing Strategies sin p transformation to stabilize the variances, as described by Winer (1971, pp. 399-400) .
1 The transThe relationship between Time, Outcome and Cuing formed proportions were then subject to a multivariate Strategy was examined using MANOVA, with the proanalysis of variance (MANOVA). Two separate MANO-portion of strategies within each time segment providing the dependent variable. Four significant interac-1 Because there are only n 0 1 degrees of freedom in a set of n tions were found: Strategy interacted with Outcome proportions, this procedure does not result in any loss of information. In the subsequent analysis of the simple effects of tactic type, how-2 As neither analysis violated sphericity assumptions, univariate ever, all n tactics were analyzed so that their effects over time could be characterized individually.
results are reported (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1983) . p õ .005, was lowest in the middle stages of the negotiation. The use of two cuing strategies differentiated distributive and integrative outcomes. When negotiations ended in distributive outcomes, dyads used more positional-information strategies, F(1,35) Å 15.54, p õ .001, and fewer priority-information strategies, F(1,35) Å 15.54, p õ .001, than when negotiations ended in integrative outcomes. The more frequent use of positional-information strategies, F(1,35) Å 5.23, p õ .05, also differentiated suboptimum from optimum outcomes, although this finding was qualified by a threeway interaction with Time, as described below.
Within the class of integrative outcomes, linear trends in the use of positional-information strategies, F(1,175) Å 9.75, p õ .005, and restructuring strategies, guished optimum and suboptimum outcomes. As can be seen in Fig. 2 , the use of positional-information strategies increased marginally over time when negotiations ended in suboptimum outcomes and decreased (distributive vs integrative), F(2,70) Å 5.97, p õ .005; over time when negotiations ended in optimum outwith Outcome (suboptimum vs optimum), F(2,70) Å comes. Conversely, the use of restructuring strategies 3.33, p õ .05; and with Time, F(10, 350 ) Å 3.09, p õ decreased over time when negotiations end in subopti-.001. These last two interactions are qualified by a mum outcomes, and increased marginally over time three-way interaction between Strategy, Time and when they ended in optimum outcomes. It is also eviOutcome (suboptimum vs optimum), F(10,350) Å 2.41, dent that, over time, the use of these strategies dip õ .01. To further explore these effects, the interacverged when negotiations ended in suboptimum outtions were decomposed by strategy into their simple
comes, converging when they ended in optimum outeffects.
comes. Analysis of simple effects showed, first, that two cuing strategies varied in their use over time. As can be Analysis of Responding Strategies seen in Fig. 1 , a significant quadratic trend in the use of positional-information strategies, F(1,175) Å 4.21, p
The relationship among Time, Outcome, and Responding Strategy was examined using MANOVA, õ .05, showed this strategy to peak in the middle stages of the negotiation. Conversely, a quadratic trend in the with the proportion of strategies within each time segment providing the dependent variable. Two significant use of concession-exchange strategies, F (1,175) Fry, 1977; Putnam & Wilson, 1989; Roloff et al., 1989 ] that the same strategy may serve are shown in Fig. 3 . A significant quadratic trend in the use of positional-information responses, F(1,175) Å either integrative or distributive functions, depending on context.) Second, negotiators become progressively 14.06, p õ .001, showed this strategy to peak in the middle stages of the negotiation. Conversely, a qua-less willing to respond by accepting opponent's arguments as the negotiation progresses. Thus, the limits dratic trend in the use of rejection responses, F(1,175) Å 8.32, p õ .005, was lowest in the middle stages of of the negotiation are defined early in the negotiation process. The key means for challenging these limits is the negotiation. Finally, a linear trend, F(1,175) Å 6.83, p Å .01, showed the acceptance of opponent's argu-in the high levels of positional-information cuing and responding cuing and responding during the middle ments to decrease over time.
The use of one response strategy differentiated dis-phases of the negotiation. Consistent with past research, our results showed tributive and integrative outcomes. In a pattern paralleling findings for the use of cue strategies, when nego-that integrative and distributive outcomes were associated with different levels of positional and priority intiations ended in distributive outcomes, dyads used fewer priority-information strategies, F(1,35) Å 8.62, formation exchange. Whereas distributive outcomes were characterized by a higher proportion of positionalp õ .01, than when negotiations ended in integrative outcomes. A second strategy, the use of position infor-information cues and responses, as well as a lower proportion of priority-information cues, the reverse was mation, was a marginally significant differentiator, true for integrative outcomes. These results clearly fit F(1,35) Å 3.83, p Å .058, between distributive and inwith Fisher and Ury's (1981) distinction between positegrative outcomes.
tional and principled bargaining and further demonstrate that low levels of positional arguing are associ-
DISCUSSION
ated with functional outcomes. They are also consistent Several strategies varied over time independent of with past research showing that integrative outcomes the way in which negotiations ended. Not only are the are characterized by higher levels of information extemporal patterns broadly consistent with phase mod-change Thompson & Hastie, 1990) . els of negotiation (as described by Holmes, 1992) , they The frequency with which tactics are used did not, howalso portrayed the negotiating process as one of de-ever, enable more fine-grained distinctions within the creasing flexibility. First, the more frequent use of con-two outcome types to be made. This suggests that, although the frequency with which strategies are used cessionary cues and rejection responses early and late channels negotiators to either a distributive or an in-be the ability to define the negotiation in common terms. Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) have shown that tegrative path, it does not determine the quality of outrepresentations of conflict converge over time and speccomes within those paths.
ulate that this may be a necessary condition for resoluExtending this point, negotiations that ended in optition. On this basis, we propose that impasse dyads fail mum and suboptimum outcomes differed in the use of to develop a common understanding of the problem, two cuing strategies (positional information; restructurand further speculate that this may, in turn, affect ing) over time. Two patterns differentiated optimum from information processing. Why such differences occur in suboptimum outcomes: The relative stability of these distributive negotiations is an open question. At a strategies over time and the extent to which their use macro-level, situational and dispositional factors may had converged or diverged by the end of negotiations. impact on cognitive representations of conflict. At a Putnam (1994) argues that the way in which negotiators micro-level, it may be the specific sequencing of straterespond to their partners' cues conveys implicit messages gies (rather than their frequency or temporal distribuabout how negotiations should be interpreted and struction) that facilitates or inhibits the development of tured. We propose that how cues are distributed over shared meaning. time also conveys an implicit message, signalling a negoWe were able to distinguish distributive and integtiators' dominant motive. Because its use is more predictrative outcomes in terms of the frequency of strategy able, the more stable of the two strategies establishes use, suggesting that information availability or sucthe negotiating context; use of the less stable strategy is cessful differentiation moves negotiators from distribuinterpreted within this context. tive to integrative outcomes: priority information exEarlier, we argued that negotiators must both create change and negotiator flexibility provide the informaand claim value to optimize outcomes. For example, tion necessary for recognizing differing priorities. Pinkley, Griffith, and Northcraft (1995) demonstrated However, maximizing benefits also requires effective that the self-reported use of mixed-motive strategies information processing or integration. This is achieved is associated with better joint outcomes. The second when negotiators are able to restructure the negotiatpattern described above identifies the management of ing process, achieving a balance between contenthese strategies as critical to achieving optimum outtiousness and cooperation. Our results suggest that, comes. Achieving optimum outcomes is a cognitively whereas the frequency with which priority and posicomplex task that requires dyads to both differentiate, tional-information strategies (as both cues and rerecognizing multiple perspectives on a problem, and sponses) are used is sufficient to move negotiators from integrate, building relationships between these perdistributive to integrative outcomes, the temporal disspectives (definitions as given by Gruenfeld, 1995) . In tribution of two cuing strategies (positional informathe present case, positional information seems better tion and restructuring) is critical to whether dyads suited to differentiation and restructuring better suited fully integrate. to integration. Our results then suggest that when these tasks are accomplished affects outcome opti-
